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Censoring the Law in California:
Decertification Revisited
By JULIE HAYWARD BIGGS*
In September of 1978 the California State Bar Conference of Dele-
gates passed a resolution recommending that the State Bar Board of
Governors consider adopting a new Rule of Court designed to set
guidelines for the decertification of appellate opinions by the California
Supreme Court.' The Rule of Court ultimately proposed was devel-
*A.B., 1966, A.M., 1969, M.S.Ed., 1970, J.D., 1978, University of Southern California.
Member, California and Colorado Bars.
1. Resolution 10-5-78, proposed by the Santa Clara County Bar Association.
The Proposed Rules read as follows:
"New Rule 979.1. Decertification of Appellate Opinions.
(a) An opinion certified by the court of appeal for publication under Rule 976
may be ordered by the Supreme Court not published for any reason on the
Supreme Court's own motion or when denying a hearing of the case, provided that:
(1) Specific reasons, expressed in terms directly related to the decertified
opinion are stated;
(2) Errors in reasoning of the court of appeal shall be specifically designated
in criminal and constitutional cases, with an express finding of no prejudicial error
where a conviction has been upheld.
(b) Public notice of the intent to consider decertification shall be made by the
Supreme Court in its Minutes. Such notice shall include:
(I) The names of persons or parties requesting decertification of opinion;
(2) The final date on which written counter-arguments and comments from
interested persons generally will be received.
(c) No decertification order shall be issued until a reasonable time has elapsed
following public notification of the intent to consider decertification. In determin-
ing what constitutes a reasonable time, the Supreme Court shall consider such mat-
ters as the complexity of the legal issues involved in the appellate opinion and the
impact of the decision.
(d) The order and explanatory statement decertifying an appellate opinion shall
be citeable in all legal proceedings for their persuasive value."
"New Rule 979.2. Precedential Value of Appellate Opinions.
(a) Appellate opinions shall have no precedential value until: (1) a hearing is
denied by the Supreme Court; or (2) the time for requesting a hearing has elapsed;
or (3) the time within which the Supreme Court may act on its own motion to hear
the case has elapsed, whichever occurs last.
(b) Between the time of publication of an opinion of the court of appeal and time
a hearing is denied, or the time to request a hearing has elapsed, or other action has
[15771
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oped in the course of extensive research into the problems posed by the
current unregulated practice of the Supreme Court which has resulted
in the deletion of nearly 150 opinions written and certified for publica-
tion by the California Court of Appeal. 2 Such problems include trial
court uncertainty as to the legal precedent to be applied, an apparently
secretive disposition of matters by the supreme court, and potential
subversion of the adversary system in appellate proceedings. These
problems have been fully treated elsewhere. 3 This Article is designed
to further the cause of legal reform by highlighting additional cases
which might otherwise slip quietly into the oblivion of the unpublished
opinion.
The cases discussed in this Article were discovered in an attempt
to update a listing of appellate court opinions ordered not published by
the California Supreme Court.4 In the course of research, the author
thoroughly checked the Supreme Court files from 1974 to the present.
Several cases 5 were discovered where letters requesting decertification
or republication had been received by the court. A comparison of the
register listing documents received by the court and the case files them-
selves revealed that not all documents received were placed in the files;
6
it is possible that the supreme court may have considered unfiled letters
regarding a case.
Research for this Article was accomplished primarily by reference
to the case files. Four cases of those examined were selected for analy-
sis. The cases cover a broad range of problems. Each case is signifi-
cant, however, in that its precedential value was considered potentially
been taken on the opinion, all appellate opinions certified for publication may be
cited in all legal proceedings for their persuasive value."
2. See generaly Note, Decertqication of Appellate Opinions: The Needfor Articulated
Judicial Reasoning and Certain Precedent in California Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1977)
(hereinafter cited as Decertflcation of Appellate Opinions).
3. Id
4. See Appendix to this Article for the updated listing.
5. Bradshaw v. Pardee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978) (No. 3-15444); Get Oil Out! v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 60 Cal. App. 3d 424 (1978) (No. 1-37167); City of Los Angeles
v. WCAB, 79 Cal. App. 3d 497 (1978) (No. 2-51929); Permanente (Kaiser) v. WCAB, 75 Cal.
App. 3d 773 (1977) (No. 3-16091); People v. Superior Court (Gutierrez), 69 Cal. App. 3d 335
(1977) (No. 1-40682); People v. Superior Court (Driscoll), 68 Cal. App. 3d 845 (1977) (Nos.
4-16489, 4-16509); In re Wright, 67 Cal. App. 3d 122 (1977) (No. 2-29456); United Airlines
v. WCAB (Scott), 65 Cal. App. 3d 199 (1976) (No. 1-38754); Deane v. Rippy, 63 Cal. App.
3d 978 (1977) (No. 2-48410); Homola v. City Products, 60 Cal. App. 3d 69 (1976) (No. 2-
46155); Burton v. Mt. Helix Gen. Hosp., 55 Cal. App. 3d 678 (1976) (No. 4-14210); Canaday
v. Superior Court (Grooms), 34 Cal. App. 3d 467 (1973) (No. 5-2018). All citations of decer-
tified cases are to the Official Advance Sheets.
6. See text accompanying notes 52-64 infra.
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great by those who sought deletion or republication. These deletions
do not comport with the publication rules currently in effect 7 nor with
the rule that automatically accords precedential value to appellate
7. CAL. R. CT. 976, 977, 978. These rules are set forth below.
RULE 976
"(a) All opinions of the Supreme Court shall be published in the Official Reports.
"(b) No opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department of the superior
court shall be published in the Official Reports unless such opinion (1) establishes a new rule
of law or alters or modifies an existing rule, (2) involves a legal issue of continuing public
interest, or (3) criticizes existing law.
"(c) Unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Court, an opinion of a Court of Appeal
or of an appellate department of the superior court shall be published in the Official Reports
if a majority of the court rendering the opinion certifies prior to the decision becoming final
in the court that it meets the standard for publication specified in subdivision (b). An opin-
ion not so certified shall nevertheless be published in the Official Reports upon order of the
Supreme Court to that effect.
"(d) Regardless of the foregoing provisions of this rule, no opinion superseded by the
granting of a hearing, rehearing or other judicial action shall be published in the Official
Reports.
"(e) Written opinions of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, and appellate depart-
ments of the superior courts shall be filed with the clerks of the respective courts. Two
copies of each opinion of the Supreme Court, and two copies of each opinion of a Court of
Appeal or of an appellate department of a superior court which the court has certified as
meeting the standard for publication specified in subdivision (b) shall be furnished by the
clerk to the Reporter of Decisions. The Reporter of Decisions shall edit the opinions for
publication as directed by the Supreme Court. Proof sheets of each opinion in the type to be
used in printing the reports shall be submitted by the Reporter of Decisions to the court
which prepared the opinion for examination, correction and final approval."
RULE 977
"An opinion of a Court of Appeal or of an appellate department of a superior court that
is not published in the Official Reports shall not be cited by a court or by a party in any
other action or proceeding except when the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of the
law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel, or in a criminal action or proceeding
involving the same respondent."
RULE 978
"(a) A request by any person for publication in the Official Reports of an opinion not
certified for publication may be made only to the court that rendered the opinion. The
request shall be made promptly by letter, with a copy of each party to the action or proceed-
ing not joining therein stating concisely why the opinion meets one or more of the criteria
for publication in Rule 976. If the court does not, or by reason of the decision's finality as to
that court cannot, grant the request, the court may, and at the instance of the person request-
ing publication shall, transmit the request and a copy of the opinion to the Supreme Court,
with its recommendation for appropriate disposition and a brief statement of its reasons
therefor.
"(b) When a request for publication is received by the Supreme Court from the court
that rendered the opinion, the Supreme Court shall either order the opinion published or
deny the request.
"(c) An order of the Supreme Court directing publication of an opinion in the Official
Reports shall not be deemed an expression of opinion of the Supreme Court of the correct-
ness of the result reached by the decision or any of the law set forth in the opinion.
May 19791
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opinions in California.8
The Problem of Judicial Lobbying
One feature that distinguishes the judicial branch of government
from the legislative branch is that the judiciary acts, theoretically, only
when confronted by arguments articulated from the perspective of liti-
gants before the court. Outsiders whose interest is related to that of the
parties before the court may intervene with an amicus brief only with
permission of the court and with notice to the litigating parties.9
This general rule of adversarial conduct does not apply to a re-
quest for decertification of appellate opinions. There is no rule of court
nor any procedure that requires notice to litigating parties that such a
request has been made, nor is the supreme court required to invite re-
sponse to such requests from interested parties or groups.' 0 However,
in cases where such a request was made, copies of the letters to the
supreme court were sent invariably to the litigants in the case. The real
problem is that the litigants are not the "interested parties" where
decertification is concerned.
By the time a request for decertification is made, the litigants have
nothing left at stake in the action. An opinion rendered by the court of
appeal has been delivered outlining the reasoning for the disposition.
The supreme court, by denying a hearing in the case, has affirmed indi-
rectly the decision of the appellate court. The decertification order
casts doubt on the reasoning of the opinion, but does not alter the result
as to the parties involved.'I The order does, however, confuse and ob-
fuscate the issues in subsequent cases in which parties may have relied
upon the opinion as precedent. Further, the decertification order cre-
ates uncertainty when a lower court has applied to litigants before it a
precedent later deleted. 12
The truly "interested parties" in decertification decisions, then, are
not and cannot be represented before the supreme court at the time that
8. Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 940, 20
Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1962).
9. CAL. R. CT. 14(b).
10. See Decertification ofApellate Opinions, supra note 2, at 1190-91.
11. Id at 1185 n.20 (citing letter from Retired Chief Justice Donald R. Wright to the
author (Nov. 9, 1976) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal)).
12. Although exhaustive research was not done on this problem at least one case was
found that directly involved it. In People v. Superior Court (Crook), 83 Cal. App. 3d 335,
147 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1978), the appellate court ordered a suppression order vacated, noting
that the trial court had erroneously relied on a decertified opinion in suppressing the evi-
dence. Id at 340, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
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order is announced unless general notice of a pending decertification
order is given' 3 because the interested parties tend to be organizations
or groups rather than identifiably injured individuals. Even if an indi-
vidual could show a direct effect on his or her later case due to
decertification of a prior opinion, doubt would remain as to his or her
standing to claim injury. No absolute right to the use of an appellate
opinion exists, however valuable it may be.
The rights and interests of subsequent litigants or of special inter-
est groups affected by an appellate opinion and its deletion are inter-
twined with the doctrine of stare decisis and the ethical constraints
imposed on the judicial system by the adversarial tradition. An exami-
nation of the procedure as it relates to those legal tenets is fundamental
to a discussion of the implications involved in decertification.
Decertification and Stare Decisis
The goal of a public judiciary, free from the specter of secret ad-
versarial lobbying, is critically dependent upon the relationship be-
tween rules of publication and the doctrine of stare decisis. To the
extent that precedential opinions may be deleted by the supreme court
without explanation or opinion, that doctrine is undermined and the
orderly developn~ent of the law is thwarted.'
4
Stare decisis depends upon the coherent development of decisional
law.' 5 In order for each case to control precedentially all subsequent
cases, conflicting opinions must necessarily be overruled. Prior to the
adoption of limiting rules, all appellate opinions were published.
Those that deviated from the mainstream were reviewed by hearing in
the supreme court and thereby brought into line. When the decision
was made to build the law by selected opinions only,' 6 publication be-
came the primary determinant of the precedential value of the cases.
The supreme court could thereafter limit the growth of the law merely
through selective publication rather than having to overrule entire
opinions. Aberrant language or trivial issues appearing in unpublished
opinions became of interest only to the litigants.
Ideally, opinions left unpublished merely elaborate the design and
13. See Decertcation of Appellate Opinions, supra note 2 at 1190-91.
14. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between publication of opinions and
stare decisis, see Seligson & Warnlof, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HAS-
TINGs L.J. 37 (1972).
15. Silverman, The Unwritten Law--the Unpublished Opinion in Caifromia, 51 CAL. ST.
B.J. 33 (1976).
16. Rule 976 was originally adopted in 1964.
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symmetry of the published law by filling in its factual applications. So
long as that is the case, the limited publication of opinions poses no
serious problems.' 7 Selecting only certain cases for publication, how-
ever, constitutes a break with tradition and necessitates new safeguards
to ensure the protection of the goals underlying the requirement that
opinions be written. The unstated assumption of the supreme court, in
adopting rules setting forth specific standards for publication of appel-
late opinions is that, in order to maintain the check on judicial reason-
ing and actions of public exposure, the courts must have articulable
reasons for selecting only certain cases to become public law.
Decertification constitutes another mode of judicial control over
the development of published law. By deleting opinions certified for
publication by the court of appeal, the supreme court attempts to prune
decisional law into uniform and coherent form by expunging opinions
which reach correct results by errant reasoning.' 8 The goals of requir-
ing written appellate opinions are undermined, however, because the
supreme court gives no explanation of its action. Thus, decertification
orders cause confusion and apparent conflict because they are theoreti-
cally founded on prescribed standards for publication that they fre-
quently do not follow.' 9
Ethical Constraints
The adversary system depends upon the right of all parties in a
case to have an opportunity to present relevant arguments. Thus, a
17. It has been strongly argued that this is not the case, however. See Kanner, The
Unpublished Appellate Opinion: Friend or Foe?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 387 (1973); Comment, Pub-
lish or Perish. The Destiny of Appellate Opinions in California, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 756
(1973). As an indication of the frustration felt by California attorneys in regard to appellate
publication, a relatively recent poll of Los Angeles attorneys showed that those polled voted
two to one against selective publication of appellate opinions under the current rules. L.A.
Daily J., Jan. 8, 1974, at 1, col. 4. Further, Justice Raymond E. Peters, who died shortly after
the procedure for decertifying appellate opinions was initiated, vehemently objected to it
and consistently dissented from the decertification orders made while he was on the bench.
See Interview with John B. Molinari (Jan. 8, 1977) (tape transcription on file with The Has-
tings Law Journal).
18. See Decertification of Appellate Opinions, supra note 2, at 1185 n.20.
19. The language in Rule 976 which most logically authorizes the practice of decertifi-
cation is "unless otherwise directed by the Supreme Court." See CAL. R. CT. 976(c). That
language introduces the procedure for certifying opinions at the court of appeal level, how-
ever, and does not specifically authorize decertification. Indeed, the provisions of the rule
relate to forced publication rather than deletion. Because a special Rule of Court was
promulgated to enable the supreme court and courts of appeal to mandate publication, CAL.
R. CT. 978, it would seem appropriate that another specific rule be adopted to permit the
court to expunge appellate opinions. But see CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 14.
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court would not presume to decide a case without first being assured
that the parties had been given that opportunity, whether or not argu-
ments were actually put forth. This opportunity to be heard is funda-
mental to the American system of justice.
To be sure, judicial proceedings are public in nature, and inter-
ested nonparties may submit arguments to influence a decision.
20
When the supreme court considers whether to grant a hearing to a case,
amicus briefs may be submitted. If a group has requested decertifica-
tion, however, a new, somewhat secretive element is added. While an
interest group might be indifferent to whether an appellate opinion re-
mains as precedent or whether the supreme court ultimately decides
and renders an opinion on the matter, that same group may have a vital
interest in maintaining some authoritative precedent. Thus a group
could easily forego submitting an amicus brief urging that a hearing be
granted or denied, only to find too late that another group had success-
fully requested deletion of the appellate opinion and with it all prece-
dent in a specific area.
The successful group, having notified only the parties to the litiga-
tion, could then have lobbied the supreme court without opposition be-
cause notice of its action would not have been publicly disclosed. This
removal of judicial acts from the public sphere portends serious ethical
problems and generates equally serious criticism. In short, it appears
that special interest groups could successfully prevail upon the supreme
court to "censor" opinions contrary to their special interests.
While the characterization of decertification as censorship is liter-
arily appealing, it is a deceptive analogy. Mere deletion of an opinion
from the written opinions does not of itself constitute censorship. The
erasure of appellate opinions when a hearing is granted to the case and
the parallel erasure when an opinion is decertified both delete the writ-
ten opinions. The primary difference is that when the supreme court
agrees to hear a case, an opinion results. When a case is merely decerti-
fled, no accessible public record exists of any reasoning of the supreme
court in response to the opinion. The fact that, of necessity, the
supreme court considers the entire case when it decertifies the opinion2'
increases uncertainty as to what significance decertification has because
of the variable number of issues an opinion may present. Thus, the
censorship label attaches because of the lack of explanation by the
supreme court rather than because the opinion is deleted. The court in
20. CAL. R. CT. 14(b).
21. See note 17 supra.
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decertifying opinions relegates them to the same status accorded opin-
ions which never see print. The fact that decertified opinions are pub-
lished before they are deleted merely highlights the fact that some
judicial explanation is required when no express standards such as




Legal ethics and the area of law practice in general have been
under attack by the public for many years. One criticism of the legal
profession is that lawyers waste court time and public money in frivo-
lous legal proceedings. While the rights of accused perpetrators of
crimes have been accorded increasing legal protection, there is growing
feeling among some public entities that perhaps criminals are being
protected at the expense of the public.
This generally critical attitude toward the legal system has been
exascerbated by increasingly frequent litigation involving legal mal-
practice. In the criminal law area, suits have been initiated for failure
to appeal and for bringing a frivolous appeal.2 3 Resolution of what
constitutes legal malpractice in criminal law is therefore of interest both
to members of the practicing bar and to the public.
The standard of negligence generally required for legal malprac-
tice to be actionable is, as in all negligence actions, a "but for" stan-
dard. That is, the plaintiff must contend that but for his attorney's
actions the plaintiff would not have been convicted. This standard does
not of necessity equate guilt with conviction. For example, a plaintiff
whose conviction was obtained through the use of illegally-obtained
evidence would have to show, in order to maintain his malpractice ac-
tion, that "but for" his attorney's negligence in failing to have the im-
properly-obtained evidence suppressed, he would not have been
convicted. In such a case, the plaintiff's actual guilt of the crime
charged would be irrelevant. 24
A recent case held that a criminal may not maintain an action
against his attorney for malpractice if, in fact, the individual committed
22. 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978) (No. 3-15444).
23. See Petition by Respondent for Reconsideration of Order Not to Publish Opinion,
Bradshaw v. Pardee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978) (No. 3-15444) (on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).
24. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel-Reflections on "Criminal
Malpractice", 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1101, 1200-06 (1974).
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the crime. The facts of Bradshaw v. Pardee25 involved a confession
made by the plaintiff after a full Miranda warning had been given. The
attorney in the case advised plaintiff to plead guilty to the crime. The
plaintiff did so and was convicted. The confession was held proper and
the court judicially noted the facts as stated by the plaintiff in the con-
fession. The plaintiff did not contend in his action against his attorney
that he had not committed the crime.26 The court of appeal held that
the defense attorney could not be held liable for negligence in failing to
obtain an acquittal in view of the facts properly admitted and uncon-
tested showing the plaintiff guilty of the crime.27
The supreme court denied hearing and, apparently on its own mo-
tion, ordered the court of appeal opinion not published. Attorneys for
the defendant responded with a petition for reconsideration of the or-
der not to publish the opinion, apparently without success.
28
The petition argued that hundreds of court-appointed attorneys
act in the same manner as the defendant in Bradshaw v. Pardee. As
such, those attorneys could use the precedent expressed in Bradshaw to
avoid unnecessary litigation and extensive defense where a simple
guilty plea would be legally sound. The precedent, according to de-
fense attorneys, could therefore reduce court delays caused by such un-
necessary caution.29
An argument in defense of decertification could also be made.
The appellate court, by taking judicial notice of the plaintiff's confes-
sion, sidestepped an important issue in criminal attorney malpractice
actions. Under the facts of this case, the validity of the confessions had
been fully reviewed in other proceedings30 so that the likelihood of at-
torney negligence in allowing it to be admitted was small. The court's
broad holding that the plaintiff must aver his innocence of the underly-
ing crime in order to maintain his cause of action ignores the possibility
that attorney malpractice in the criminal area could, and most likely
would, involve negligence in procedural matters. Further, the court
made no attempt to consider the ramifications of its holding.3'
25. 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978) (No. 3-15444).
26. Id at 571.
27. Id at 573.
28. Petition by Respondent for Reconsideration of Order Not to Publish Opinion,
Bradshaw v. Pardee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978) (No. 3-15444).
29. Id at 2.
30. See 78 Cal. App. 3d at 571.
3 1. For example, such a holding would raise serious problems of standard of proof of
the plaintiff's guilt and admissibility of evidence. See Kaus & Mallen, The Misgulding Hand
of Counsel-Rlections on Criminal Malpractice, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1191, 1204 (1974).
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The above argument is of course speculative, because the reason
for decertification of the opinion is unknown. Its potential for clarifica-
tion of standards of legal practice for criminal defense attorneys, how-
ever, is clear. If the supreme court found this standard unacceptable, it
could have issued a simple statement of the appropriate standard under
the proposed Rule of Court. In any event, some explanation of the
court's apparently arbitrary action would have been beneficial to the
public and bar alike. The deletion of this opinion, however, suggests a
decision to avoid taking an unpopular stand by reversing or clarifying
the standard presented.
Deane v. Rippy32
This case involved a suit for declaratory relief and an accounting
brought by Bette Deane against Flossie Rippy and her son Rodney Al-
len Rippy, a child actor known primarily by his appearances in Jack-
in-the-Box commercials. Mrs. Deane had a signed contract with Mrs.
Rippy, providing that Mrs. Deane would act as a "personal manager"
for Rodney and that she would receive ten percent of Rodney's earn-
ings received by Rodney or his mother during the term of the contract.
The Rippys filed a cross claim for failure to account, an accounting,
and punitive damages. The trial court held that the contract was inva-
lid, and awarded defendants $195.71 plus interest and costs. Mrs. De-
ane appealed.
The issues on appeal, according to the appellate court, were (1)
whether a contract for services of a personal manager may be disaf-
firmed by or on behalf of a minor; and (2) whether such a disaffirm-
ance, if valid, will relieve the parent of liability under the contract. 33
The court answered both questions in the affirmative.
The court found that a contract entered into by a parent on behalf
of a minor cannot be enforced against the minor because the minor is
not a party principal to the contract and even if he were, the contract
would be voidable under California Civil Code section 35.34 Even if
Rodney had been a party principal, as the court found he was, he could
have disaffirmed the contract. Yet, the court also noted that it is ridicu-
lous to believe that Rodney at four years of age could disaffirm the
contract. His mother in her representative capacity was therefore held
32. 63 Cal. App. 3d 978 (1977) (No. 2-48410).
33. Id. at 982.
34. Id at 982-83.
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able to disaffarm the contract she made as an adult, because her son
could not yet effectively determine the value of the contract.
The significant aspect, in terms of the decertification controversy,
is not the ability of the parent to disaffirm the contract on behalf of the
minor, but rather the statements by the court of appeal that the per-
sonal management contract was voidable, if not void, because Mrs.
Deane was acting as an employment agency. Under California law, an
individual acting as an employment agency must be licensed by the
state.35 The court held that Mrs. Deane was operating without the nec-
essary license.
Two law firms active in entertainment law wrote to the court to
request decertification because of this purportedly erroneous statement
of law.36 The attorneys presented strong arguments that in the en-
tertainment field personal managers are a special group who facilitate
the work of agents, but who do not constitute employment agencies.
37
The supreme court apparently agreed with those attorneys because the
35. Id at 986.
36. See letter from Law Offices of Howard L. Thaler to Justices of the Supreme Court
(Jan. 7, 1977); letter from Fulop, Ralston, Bums & McKittrick to Justices of the Supreme
Court (Jan. 4, 1977) (copies on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
37. John Petrasich from Fulop, Ralston, Bums & McKittrick cited two cases on point,
Raden v. Laurie, 120 Cal. App. 2d 778, 262 P.2d 36 (1953), and Buchwald v. Superior Court,
254 Cal. App. 2d 347,62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967). Letter from Fulop, Ralston, Bums & McKit-
trick to Justices of the Supreme Court (Jan. 4, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law
Journal). Additionally, he argued:
"The retrial of the "Jefferson Airplane" case [Buchwald v. Superior Court, supra] is
now scheduled to commence on January 10, 1977 in the San Francisco Superior Court. The
issues there to be litigated include whether and to what extent the licensing laws were in-
tended to cover the activities of Mr. Katz, as reflected in his written agreements, and/or as
contained in his "actual" agreements, to the extent that there may have been any variance
between the two. In the context of the "Jefferson Alirplane" trial, both sides have a definite
and substantial stake in the outcome, and both sides are now preparing to introduce literally
hundreds of items of documentary evidence, to call numerous witnesses, including experts in
various fields, and to exhaustively brief and argue all of the legal questions, in an effort to
thoroughly litigate the applicability, if any, of the licensing statutes to the standard form of
"Personal Manager's Contract" which Mr. Katz employed when contracting with the mem-
bers of Jefferson Airplane.
"Now, on the brink of trial, the Court of Appeal has certified a decision for publication
in the matter of Deane v. Roppy, which contains sweeping-statements as to the "illegality" of
various contractual provisions that are found in every "personal manager's" contract (be-
cause of what everyone previously assumed to be the law when they developed the standard
form of their contract) without regard to whether the "personal manager" was endeavoring
in good faith to confine his activities to areas which did not need any license, or whether he
was endeavoring in bad faith to draft his contract so as to avoid the license.
"Thus, for example, the Rppy Court states, in substance that a contract to "advise" with
respect to "offers of employment," cannot be entered into without an employment agency's
license because of that portion of Business and Professions Code § 9902(a) which specifies
May 1979] DECERTIFICATION
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opinion was subsequently deleted. As the supreme court did not com-
ment on the matter, however, the assumption that it accepted this point
of view is in fact mere speculation.
Had the supreme court operated under the proposed Rule of
Court, a simple statement clarifying the licensing requirements as to
entertainment personal managers could have resolved the problem. As
things now stand, the attorneys who requested decertification, the
supreme court, the court of appeal, and possibly readers of this Article,
are the only parties with any idea of the import of the decertification
order.
United Air Lines v. WCAB (Scott)38
This case involved a reversal of the Workers' Compensation Ap-
peals Board by the court of appeal, reinstating the Workers' Compen-
sation judge's opinion in the matter. Briefly, the plaintiff claimed
damages caused by confrontations with his supervisor over such mat-
ters as "excessive talking, insufficient production, unsatisfactory absen-
teeism, and theft of company property." 39 In essence, the plaintiff
claimed mental and emotional injury because he was confronted with
his own incompetence in a business setting.
The Workers' Compensation judge found that the "applicant
freely left his employment with United Airlines simply because he dis-
liked the type of employment." 40 The judge's opinion was based on the
testimony of both the plaintiff, Scott, and the medical opinion of an
that one must have a license to be engaged in the business of giving information as to where
andfrom whom such help, employment or engagement may be procured. [Emphasis added].
"To say that every contract for advice concerning offers of employment requires a li-
cense, without regard to the kind of advice contemplated, or the particular intention of the
contracting parties, cannot possibly be the law. Yet, that is precisely what Deane P. Rippy
seems to suggest, contrary to the views previously enumerated in Raden and Buchwald." Id
at 6-7.
Further, Mr. Petrasich asserted, "Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal's Opinion in
Deane v. Ripy, does not focus on any of the subtle but extremely significant issues that form
the integral components of the overall licensing question and the reason that it does not do
so is that none of the parties involved in that case had any interest in litigating the issues
relating to whether or not Mrs. Deane needed to have the license which she infact had, but
which the Court of Appeal mistakingly assumed that she lacked.
"Accordingly, the Court of Appeal's Opinion in Deane v. Rippy is unreliable at best,
whereas, at the same time, artists and personal managers throughout the state have for years
been contracting in reliance upon a concept of the law which the Opinion threatens to shat-
ter." Id at 9.
38. 65 Cal. App. 3d 199 (1976) (No. 1-38754).
39. Id. at 202.
40. Id.
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expert witness.4' In essence, a conflict appeared in the testimony of the
two witnesses. The judge, as the trier of fact, accepted the version of
facts submitted by the doctor. The court of appeal found that the
judge's determination of credibility had to control the ultimate decision
in the case. 42
The court found that the Appeal Board's determination was not
supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole.4
3
Further, the court found that the Board virtually ignored the judge's
findings of fact and merely selected parts of the testimony of the plain-
tiff and of other doctors as the basis for reversal. 44 The Board specifi-
cally held that emotional stress resulting from employment experiences
was compensable whether or not any harrassment had occurred. Thus,
it was enough that the plaintiff felt harrassed and was suffering emo-
tional distress.
Even plaintiffs own physician had qualified his evaluation by stat-
ing that interpersonal difficulties are universal complaints and cannot
be insured against. The court of appeal further found that the award
was unreasonable because the plaintiff was not subjected to any unu-
sual stress or strain.45 The court also expressed concern that absent
reversal of the Board, an unreasonable and "wholly mischievous" pre-
cedent would be set.46 In publishing the appellate opinion, the court
clearly attempted to rectify any misconception that could have resulted
from the Board's decision. The supreme court obliterated that prece-
dent when it ordered the opinion not published. Following the
decertification decision, interested attorneys filed with the supreme
court a request to publish the opinion under Rule 978.4 7 The request,
however, was denied.
This case offered the potential resolution of a recurring Workers'
41. Id
42. Id at 204.
43. Id at 204-07.
44. Id at 206.
45. Id at 207.
46. Id at 208.
47. See letter from Zonni, Ginocchio & Taylor to the Supreme Court of California
(Mar. 3, 1978) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal). The parties were erroneously
directed to petition the Court of Appeal for publication, which they did, only to be told to
write the Supreme Court on the matter. See letter from George C. Bishel, Clerk of the
Supreme Court of California to Ben F. Taylor (Mar. 9, 1978); letter from Clifford C. Porter,
Clerk of the First District Court of Appeal to Ben F. Taylor (Mar. 27, 1978) (copies on file
with The Hastings Law Journal). The parties directed all their correspondence to the
Supreme Court again, where it was filed. See letter from Zonni, Ginocchio & Taylor to the
Supreme Court of California (Apr. 3, 1978) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
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Compensation problem. As the attorneys argued, the opinion met at
least two of the purported standards for publication currently in ef-
fect.48 It established a new rule of law, and it involved an issue of
continuing public interest. Deletion of opinions falling within existing
standards is not a new phenomenon, however.
49
An additional argument was advanced by the attorneys related to
the public relations aspect of the decision:
The Scott Decision if certified would demonstrate to the public that
there are some limits to compensable claims. It would illustrate to
the countless numbers of employees who are also dissatisfied with
their present jobs, that there are limitations to the compensability of
simple, ordinary frustrations of a job and the effect of strained inter-
personal relationships which are personal in nature and constitute a
personal risk.
50
Scott demonstrates the absurdity of attempting to use procedures such
as decertification to achieve substantive ends. Not only is the public
left without precedent in a sensitive area, but also attorneys seeking the
Court's attention are frustrated by the lack of formal procedures by
which it may be obtained. The proposed new Rule of Court would
clarify both the responsibility of the court to make its action public and
the procedures available to parties seeking court action.
Driscoll v. Superior Court5
Perhaps the most disturbing case in the decertification controversy
is Driscoll v. Superior Court. The defendant was accused of murdering
her husband and two children. A letter written by the defendant
describing her mental state, obtained by searching the office of the de-
fendant's attorney under a validly issued search warrant, was ruled
inadmissible. 52 An appeal of the order was made to the court of appeal
with a resulting opinion rendered in favor of the prosecution, whereby
the letter was allowed into evidence. 53 The people later stipulated to a
judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity.54 The opinion was certi-
fied for publication by the appellate court and became final on May 18,
48. See letter from Zonni, Ginocchio & Taylor to the Supreme Court of California
(Mar. 3, 1978) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
49. See Decertification of Appellate Opinions, supra note 2, at 1188 n.40.
50. See letter from Zonni, Ginocchio & Taylor to the Supreme Court of California
(Mar. 3, 1978) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
51. 68 Cal. App. 3d 845 (1977) (Nos. 4-16489, 4-16509).
52. Id. at 850.
53. Id. at 853.
54. Order of the California Supreme Court (May 6, 1977). See also letter from Edward
M. Wright to the Author (Jan. 10, 1979) (copy on file with The Hastings La, Journal).
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1977. On June 6, 1977, the supreme court received from Alex Landon
on behalf of California Attorneys for Criminal Justice a request that
the opinion be either decertified or that request for hearing be
granted.5
The facts surrounding the decertification, rather than the opinion
itself, are of primary importance. The Attorney General's office op-
posed the request for decertification by letter dated June 9, 1977.56 On
June 24, 1977, Milton I. Silverman, attorney for the defendant, wrote
another letter to the supreme court setting forth facts in the case and
arguing for deletion of the opinion. 57 On August 18, 1977, three
months after the opinion became final, the supreme court ordered it not
published.
Defendant's attorneys subsequently initiated a civil suit against the
County of San Diego and some individuals for tort damages resulting
from an unlawful search and seizure of privileged information. In Oc-
tober 1977, one of the individual defendants in that suit requested the
appellate court to order the opinion in Driscoll published contrary to
the supreme court's ruling on the grounds that the tort suit constituted
a new circumstance of which the supreme court could not have been
aware at the time the opinion was ordered deleted.5 8
On October 12, 1977, Milton Silverman opposed that request.5 9
Justice Gerald Brown, who wrote the original opinion, forwarded the
request to publish to the supreme court on October 14, 1977 recom-
mending that publication be ordered.60 Justice Brown expressed con-
cern that problems could arise regarding res judicata, collateral
estoppel or stare decisis. On October 28, 1977, Alex Landon again on
behalf of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, wrote the
supreme court opposing reinstatement of the opinion in the published
law.61 On November 17, 1977, the request to publish was denied.
55. See letter from Alex Landon to the California Supreme Court (June 3, 1977) (copy
on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
56. Letter from Karl J. Phaler, Deputy Attorney General to Hon. Rose Bird, Chief
Justice (June 9, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
57. See letter from Milton J. Silverman to Hon. Rose Bird, Chief Justice (June 24,
1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
58. Letter from Edwin L. Miller, Jr., District Attorney, to Hon. Gerald Brown, Presid-
ing Justice, Court of Appeal (Oct. 7, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
59. Letter from Milton J. Silverman to Hon. Gerald Brown, Presiding Justice, Court of
Appeal (Oct. 12, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
60. Letter from Hon. Gerald Brown, Presiding Justice, Court of Appeal to Hon. Rose
Bird, Chief Justice (Oct. 14, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
61. Letter from Alex Landon to Hon. Rose Bird, Chief Justice (Oct. 28, 1977) (copy on
file with The Hastings Law Journal).
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None of this correspondence is in the court file of the case. 62 Ad-
ditionally, only the request to decertify, received on June 6, 1977, and
the request to publish dated October 7, 1977, are noted in the supreme
court register. Without knowledge obtained from other sources that
such correspondence had occurred, the interested parties could not
have refuted the arguments advanced nor could they have supplied
other arguments in a timely manner.
The apparent confusion concerning the use of an unpublished
opinion as res judicata or collateral estoppel in a subsequent case is
also highlighted in Driscoll. Rule 977, which prohibits citation of un-
published opinions, specifically excludes from that prohibition cases
where the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the
case apply. 63 Nevertheless, the parties as well as the appellate judge
expressed concern that the opinion could not be used unless it was pub-
lished.64 If this misconception is widespread, potentially large numbers
of litigants could be inhibited unnecessarily in their use of appellate
opinions.
Further, in Driscoll both sides conceded the fact that the opinion
fell within the parameters of the standards for publication stated in
Rule 976. Mr. Silverman, who authored an article criticizing the selec-
tive publication process, 65 urged in this case that the supreme court has
plenary power over opinion publication regardless of whether a hear-
ing is granted in the case. 66 Silverman stated that the opinion in
Driscoll was an "abomination" and was clearly "wrong. '67 If so, one
62. Interestingly, Justice Frank Newman recently commented on this subject at a
luncheon meeting at the Los Angeles County Bar Association. The Los Angeles Daily
Journal reported that Newman "noted that the letters [received from attorneys and other
interested parties prior to decision by the Supreme Court] cannot go into the case file be-
cause they do not conform to court rules for briefs. He indicated that lawyers should send
copies of their letters to their opponents." L.A. Daily J., Jan. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 4. The
comments are interesting because they underscore the fact that Supreme Court Justices read
and may consider arguments made outside the regular appellate procedure. That such let-
ters are not regularly and consistently placed in the court file compounds the difficulty. At
least if such letters are filed, a full record exists of all legal and special interest correspon-
dence. Without such a record, the possibility exists that extraneous or even fraudulent fac-
tors may bear on the ultimate decision of the court.
63. CAL. R. CT. 977. For text of Rule 977, see note 7 supra.
64. See letters cited notes 58-60 supra.
65. Silverman, The Unwritten Law-The Unpublished Opinion in California, 51 CAL.
ST. B.J. 33 (1976).
66. See letter from Milton J. Silverman to Hon. Gerald Brown, Presiding Justice,
Court of Appeal (Oct. 12, 1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journal).
67. See letter from Milton J. Silverman to Hon. Rose Bird, Chief Justice (June 24,
1977) (copy on file with The Hastings Law Journalj.
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would think that justice for Mrs. Driscoll required a hearing of the
case, not deletion of the opinion.
Conclusion
The continuing use of an unsanctioned procedure to delete rather
than to resolve controversial issues is contrary to judicial integrity. In
this time of public criticism of the supreme court because of allegedly
secretive maneuvers, 68 some action, whether it be adoption of the pro-
posed new Rule of Court, or direct abolition of the decertification pro-
cedure, is essential to continuation of a publicly responsive and
responsible judiciary.
68. Ze., the recent criticism during the election of November 7, 1978, confirming Hon.
Rose Bird and other recent appointees to the California Supreme Court. See L.A. Times,
Nov. 7, 1978, at 1, col. 3.
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Appendix
The following cases represent an update of those cases listed in the Appendix
to Note, Decerti/ication of Appellate Opinions. The Needfor Articulated Judicial
Reasoning and Certain Precedent in Caifornia Law, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181
(1977). All citations are to the Official Advance Sheets. The docket numbers
are also listed. On at least two occasions, as indicated below, deleted cases
have been erroneously cited by the appellate court.
1977
American St. Bank v. Avco, 71 Cal. App. 3d 774 (No. 4-17162). Hearing de-
nied, ordered not published, 10-27-77.
Deane v. Rippy, 63 Cal. App. 3d 978 (No. 2-48410). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 1-27-77.
In re Charyn, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355 (No. 1-16066). Hearing denied, ordered not
published, 9-8-77.
Minkin v. Signal Insurance Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 189 (No. 2-50760). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 10-20-77.
People v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 74 Cal. App. 3d 656 (No. 5-3254). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 12-28-77.
People v. Dorland, 72 Cal. App. 3d 972 (No. 5-2809). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 10-20-77.
People v. Hanson, 84 Cal. App. 3d 517 (No. 1-15652). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 1-26-78. Cited in People v. Willis, 84 Cal. App. 3d 952,
957 (9-18-78).
People v. Karsnok, 83 Cal. App. 3d 230 (No. 2-29333). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 10-10-77.
People v. Morris, 72 Cal. App. 3d 225 (No. 2-28636). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 10-27-77.
People v. Silverton, 71 Cal. App. 3d 790 (Nos. 2-28211, 30496). Hearing de-
nied, ordered not published, 9-8-77.
Sierra Club v. County of Alameda (Diamond), 73 Cal. App. 3d 572 (No. 1-
38554). Ordered not published, 12-29-77.
1978
Agric. Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Superior Court (Laflin), 77 Cal. App. 3d 248 (No. 4-
19156). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 4-27-78.
Anderson v. State of California, 83 Cal. App. 3d 188 (No. 4-19261). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 9-20-78.
Bellarmine College Prep. v. City of San Jose, 81 Cal. App. 3d 813 (No. 1-
38857). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 9-14-78.
Bradshaw v. Pardee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 567 (No. 3-15444). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 5-11-78.
California Regional Water Quality Control Board v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.
App. 3d 471 (No. 5-3640). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 3-9-78.
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City of Los Angeles v. WCAB, 79 Cal. App. 3d 497 (No. 2-51929). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 6-1-78.
Faan v. National Enquirer, Inc., 78 Cal. App. 3d 543 (No. 2-51523). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 3-13-78.
Foote v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. App. 3d 478 (No. 4-40750). Hearing denied,
ordered not published, 6-29-78.
Gilmore v. Tucker, 83 Cal. App. 3d 664 (No. 3-15970). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 10-4-78.
In re Reynolds, 72 Cal. App. 3d 489 (No. 1-16765). Ordered not published, 5-
15-78.
In re Alfred S., 78 Cal. App. 3d 105 (No. 2-31198). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 5-18-78.
In re Berry, 75 Cal. App. 3d 270 (No. 1-16913). Hearing denied, ordered not
published, 1-19-78.
In re Stanley, 75 Cal. App. 3d 582 (No. 2-30609). Hearing denied, ordered not
published, 1-26-78.
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Inc., 76 Cal. App. 3d 985, (No. 2-50539). Hearing denied,
ordered not published, 3-16-78.
In re Marriage of Ketscher, 79 Cal. App. 3d 527 (No. 5-3018). Hearing de-
nied, ordered not published, 6-22-78.
Leggett v. Rodeway Inn, Inc., 81 Cal. App. 3d 638 (No. 3-16955). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 8-31-78.
London v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 1 (No. 1-42677). Hearing denied,
ordered not published, 7-13-78.
Mercury Casualty Co. v. Kamae, 78 Cal. App. 3d 525 (No. 4-17687). Hearing
denied, ordered not published, 5-4-78.
Monitor Technology, Inc. v. Hetrick, 76 Cal. App. 3d 912 (No. 1-40963).
Hearing denied, ordered not published, 3-23-78.
People v. Anderson, 77 Cal. App. 3d 975 (No. 2-29378). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 4-20-78.
People v. Apelby, 78 Cal. App. 3d 73 (No. 2-29834). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 4-27-78.
People v. Bush, 81 Cal. App. 3d 138 (No. 3-9215). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 7-20-78.
People v. Caves, 80 Cal. App. 3d 360 (No. 4-9754). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 6-22-78.
People v. Keenberg, 75 Cal. App. 3d 988 (No. 2-30313). Hearing denied, or-
dered not published, 2-10-78.
People v. Lopez, 77 Cal. App. 3d 313 (No. 3-9078). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 3-23-78.
People v. Lopez, 79 Cal. App. 3d 963 (No. 2-31650). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 6-15-78.
People v. Municipal Court (Martinez), 75 Cal. App. 3d 946 (No. 4-17612).
Hearing denied, ordered not published, 2-10-78.
People v. Silva, 82 Cal. App. 3d 917 (No. 2-29296). Ordered not published, 9-
14-78.
People v. Smith, 80 Cal. App. 3d 111 (No. 4-8669). Hearing denied, ordered
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not published, 6-29-78. Cited in People v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 380, 388
n.1 (5-31-78).
People v. Superior Court (Kurbegovic), 84 Cal. App. 3d 267, (Nos. 2-53175,
53234). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 10-18-78.
People v. Wiles, 75 Cal. App. 3d 725 (No. 4-8509). Hearing denied, ordered
not published, 3-9-78.
People v. Zuckerman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 846 (No. 2-30053). Hearing denied,
ordered not published, 2-10-78.
Permanente Medical Group (Kaiser) v. WCAB, 75 Cal. App. 3d 733 (No. 3-
16091). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 2-23-78.
Socialist Labor Party v. City of Glendale, 82 Cal. App. 3d 722 (No. 2-52122).
Hearing denied, ordered not published, 10-4-78.
United Employees Local 390, SEIU, AFL-CIO v. City of Richmond, 80 Cal.
App. 3d 468 (No. 1-41880). Hearing denied, ordered not published, 7-26-78.
